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（“Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna”）ではなく、「大乗の信を起こすこと」





































































































































































































































るだろうか？（英訳は Buswell, 149–150 頁）
ジヌルはその著作の全編を通じて本質とはたらきの枠組みを引き合いに出
− 148 −







































































































































Buswell, Robert E. Jr, ed. Chinul 知訥: Selected Works. Vol. 2. Collected Works of 
Korean Buddhism. Seoul: Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism, 2012.
Cheng, Chung–Ying. “On The Metaphysical Significance Of Ti (Body–Embodiment) In 
Chinese Philosophy: Benti (Origin–Substance) And Ti–Yong (Substance And Func-
tion).”Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29 (2) (2002): 145–161.
Chung, Edward Y. J.The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T'oegye and Yi Yulgok: A Reap-
praisal of the “ Four-Seven Thesis” and Its Practical Implications for Self-Cultiva-
tion. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
Cua, Antonio S. “On The Ethical Significance Of The Ti–Yong Distinction.” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 29 (2) (2002): 163–170.
船山徹。「体用小考」。宇佐美文理編、『六朝隋唐精神史の研究』。125–136。科学
研究費補助金研究成果報告書、2004。
Gedalecia, David. “Excursion in Substance and Function: The Development of the Tʼi-
Yung Paradigm in Chu Hsi.”Philosophy East and West 24 (4) (1974): 443–451.
平井俊栄。「中国仏教と体用思想」。『理想』549 （1979）：60–72。
Kalton, Michael. The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation. Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1994.
Kong, Roberta Lion. “Metaphysics and East-West Philosophy: Applying the Chinese Tʼ
i-yung Paradigm.” Philosophy East and West 29 (1) 49–58. 
Lai, Whalen. The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun): A Study of 
the Unfolding of Sinitic Mahayana Motifs. Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 
1975.
Lai, Whalen W. “Ch'an Metaphors: Waves, Water, Mirror, Lamp.” Philosophy East and 
West 29 (1983): 243–253.
Lynn, Richard John. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te 
Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. The classic of the way and virtue. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Muller, A. Charles. “The Key Operative Concepts in Korean Buddhist Syncretic 
Philosophy: Interpenetration and Essence-Function in Wŏnhyo, Chinul and Kihwa.” 
Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen University 3 (1995): 33–48.
− 154 −
----. “The Composition of Self-Transformation Thought in Classical East Asian 
Philosophy and Religion.” Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen University 4 (1996): 141–152.
----. “Tiyong and Interpenetration in the Analects of Confucius: The Sacred as Secular.” 
Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen University 8 (2000): 93–106. 
----. Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Chŏng Tojŏn (Sambong) 
and Hamhŏ Tŭkt’ong (Kihwa). Korea's Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2015.
Park, Sung Bae. One Koreanʼs Approach to Buddhism: The Mom/Momjit Paradigm. 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2009. 
----. Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment. Albany: SUNY Press, 1983. 
島田虔次。『朱子学と陽明学』。岩波書店、東京、1967。 
---- 「体用の歴史に寄せて」。『仏教史学論集 : 塚本博士頌寿記念』、416–432。塚
本博士頌寿記念会、東京、1991。
【注】








５ Michael Kalton, The Four-Seven Debate および Edward Chung, The Korean Neo-
Confucianism of Yi T’oegye で解説されている。
６ 例えば Cheng, Cua, Gedalecia, Kong らの論文を参照。
７ 特に『老子』第 38 章に対する王弼の注釈を参照（英訳に Richard Lynn 
（1999） がある）。船山 （2004） で論じられているとおり、この概念を最初に
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わけではない。
８ Sung Bae Park, Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment 参照。
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だと主張している。Buswell, Chinul: Selected Works, 89 頁を参照。そこでは
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dae han saero un ihae”）への参照を求めている。
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The Emergence of Essence-Function (ti-yong) 體用 
Hermeneutics in the Sinification of Indic Buddhism : 
An Overview
A. Charles MULLER
 The essence-function 體用  (Ch. ti-yong, K. che-yong, J. tai-yū; in non-Bud-
dhological studies in Japan, tai-yō) paradigm can be seen as the most pervasively-
used hermeneutical framework in the interpretation of Chinese, Korean, and 
Japanese religious and philosophical works ranging from as early as the 5th 
century BCE up to premodern times. It developed in richness during the course of 
its application in Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, first in China, where it 
was applied extensively in the sinification of Indian Buddhist doctrine, and 
formed the basic framework for the philosophy of the Chinese indigenous schools 
of Buddhism such as Huayan, Tiantai, and Chan, often in analogous forms such as 
li-shi 理事. It was then further transformed and expanded in its usage in Song 
Neo-Confucianism, especially in the form yet another analogue li-qi 理氣. As 
both Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism took root in Korea, Korean scholars made 
extensive use of the che-yong paradigm, both in the interpretation of the 
individual religions of Confucianism and Buddhism, as well as in interreligious 
dialog and debate. This paper seeks to revive discussion of this vitally important 
philosophical paradigm, which has been almost fully ignored in Buddhological 
studies, both East and West, by examining its early appearances in Chinese 
Buddhist commentary, and then its role in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, as 
well as some examples of its usage in Korean Buddhism, in the writings of 
Wonhyo and Jinul.
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The Emergence of Essence-Function (ti-yong) 體用 
Hermeneutics in the Sinification of Indic Buddhism : 
An Overview
A. Charles Muller
1. Essence-function 體用 : Introduction
 This examination of the place of the essence-function paradigm 體用 (Ch. ti-
yong, K. che- yong, J. tai-yū; in non-Buddhological studies in Japan, tai-yō) in 
early Chinese Buddhist sources marks an attempt at re-opening discussion 
regarding the earliest and most pervasive form of East Asian Buddhist 
hermeneutics, with essence-function being the most widely-used hermeneutical 
framework for East Asian Buddhist commentators for several centuries. I say “re-
opening” because it was a topic that received some attention a couple of decades 
ago when philosophical interest in early Chinese Buddhism was at a peak, but 
which fell from attention without ever being fully explored.
 My first introduction to the topic of essence-function came from my graduate 
school advisor, Sung Bae Park. Prof. Park was trained as a Seon monk in the 
Korean Jogye order, and was taught with this analytic tool by his Seon master in 
Korea, Seongcheol 性徹 Sunim (1912–1993), regarded by many as the greatest 
Korean monk of the twentieth century.1
  
Park introduced ti-yong in university 
classes as the most appropriate way of interpreting East Asian philosophical/
religious discourse in Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism. But he also taught it 
as a way of examining and evaluating oneʼs own personal spiritual life as 
juxtaposed with the necessities of dealing with the complex problems of the 
secular world, for removing the artificial barriers we construct between our “inner 
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experience” and “outer realities,” and as a way of distinguishing genuine altruistic 
attitudes from utilitarian, external behavior, the secular and spiritual, and so forth.
 Historically speaking, ti-yong is a distinctive sinitic archetypical concept that 
serves as the basic philosophical organizing framework for all three major East 
Asian religious traditions of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, and is the 
primary paradigm that distinguishes East Asian Buddhism from its Indic and 
Tibetan forms.2 For this reason, this concept is often not well understood by 
scholars who specialize in Indian, Southeast Asian, or Tibetan Buddhism, while 
on the other hand, is often taken for granted by scholars of East Asian thought, 
due to its ubiquitous presence in Sinitic philosophical literature. Generally 
speaking, it refers to the deeper, more fundamental, more internal, more 
important, or invisible aspects of something: any kind of being, organization, 
phenomenon, concept, event, etc. Its application in the major East Asian thought 
systems varies according to the circumstance. In the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, an 
essence-function relationship is seen between underlying principles, or originary 
forms, and natural or man-made objects; the “principles” of things, as opposed to 
their more outwardly manifest, phenomenal aspects, such as, for example, the 
uncarved block 樸  and the utensils 器  of the Daodejing, or the utility and non-
utility of the gnarled trees in the Zhuangzi. In the Buddhist commentarial 
tradition, it links the inner meaning of the doctrine with its verbal expressions; it 
also comes to be used as a way of dissolving the dualism between form 色  and 
emptiness 空, prajñā 智慧 and skillful means 方便, and so forth. But its most 
important application, seen in both Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, is that of 
che referring to the human mind, especially the deeper, more hidden dimension of 
the human mind—the pure, innate mind as it is before entering into the realm of 
activity. In this context, che refers to the sage-mind, Dao-mind, or Buddha-mind, 
and yong to the behavior of the person; and that behavior may be the behavior of 
an ordinary unenlightened person, a bodhisattva, or a buddha. In Confucianism, 
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this behavior, or function, could either be that of the petty man 小人 , or the noble 
man 君子. Although the archetype is not specifically designated with the 
graphemic compound ti-yong 體用 until the third century CE, analogous 
philosophical paradigms can be discerned in texts going back as far as the 5th 
century BCE, including the Liji, Yijing, Daodejing, Analects, and so forth, being 
expressed in such forms as roots and branches 本末 , stillness and movement 靜
動 and others. An oft-cited line from the Liji reads:
 人生而靜，天之性也。感於物而動，性之欲也。物至知知，然後好惡形焉。
好惡無 節於內，知誘於外，不能反躬，天理滅矣。
 A man is born quiescent, as it is his inborn nature. His mind moves when affected 
by external things, which is the nature of desire. As he encounters things, he knows 
more and more, subsequently giving rise to the forms that are liked and disliked. 
When liking and disliking these are not regulated within, and his awareness is 
enticed to external things, he cannot reflect upon himself, and his inborn principle 
disappears. (Liji 禮記, Leji 樂記7)
 This is an extremely important passage in the origins of Sinitic thought, as 
East Asian intuitions of static vs. active are so often virtually equivalent with 
those of nonbeing and being 無 / 有, thusness and conditioned phenomena 眞如 /
有爲.  Additionally, here, the human being is understood to possess a 
fundamentally serene nature (“essence” 體), which can be led astray in its 
function (用). This same model of “fundamental goodness” which can evolve in 
either wholesome or unwholesome directions will later be articulated repeatedly 
in Confucianism, Daoism, and East Asian forms of Buddhism.
 In Confucianism, this underlying paradigm can be seen in such 
manifestations as humaneness 仁 as “essence,” along with its “functions” of 
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propriety 禮, filial piety 孝, justice 義, and so forth. In Daoism, it is seen in such 
pairs as the Way and its power 道 / 德, the uncarved block and utensils 樸 / 器, 
black and white 黑 / 白 and so forth. In Buddhism, the ti-yong paradigm takes a 
pivotal role in reinterpreting Indian Buddhist doctrine, by taking such seemingly 
dichotomous notions as wisdom and expedient means 般若 / 方便 , emptiness and 
form 空 / 色, principle and teaching 理 / 教, principle and phenomena 理 /事 , and 
Buddha-nature and sentient being 佛性 / 衆生, conjoining them as two aspects of 
a single thing. As distinctive Chinese forms of Buddhism develop, they are deeply 
structured by ti- yong: essence-function is used extensively as an exegetical tool 
by Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597) and his students; it structures the entire discourse of 
such influential texts as the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (as typified by the 
famous water/waves simile for enlightenment and affliction), the Platform Sutra 
(with lamp and its light as metaphor for meditation and wisdom), and in the Sutra 
of Perfect Enlightenment (with Chapter One, the “sudden” chapter, representing 
essence, and the ensuing “gradual” chapters, representing function). And as Sung 
Bae Park has discussed at considerable length in his book Buddhist Faith and 
Sudden Enlightenment, it is the basis for the entire East Asian Buddhist 
explanation of the sudden and gradual aspects of enlightenment. It is used by the 
Huayan masters to structure their soteriological system of the four levels of 
religious awareness 四法界,3 using the ti- yong terminology, but even more, the 
analogous, but more narrowly focused li-shi 理事 (principle and phenomena) 
terminology. With the rise of Song Neo-Confucianism, the li-shi framework is 
taken up and adapted by the Cheng brothers 二程 4
 
and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) 
into the li-qi 理氣 (principle and material force) hermeneutic, which is used to 
explicate the nature and feelings 性 / 情 of human beings throughout the Confucian 
classics, based on the distinction made between the human nature and feelings in 
the Doctrine of the Mean 中庸. It is in Joseon Korea where the most advanced 
discussion of the relationship between the original human nature and the emotions 
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took place in the form of the Four-Seven Debate,5
 
and it is the originator of the 
Four-Seven Debate, Toegye (1501- 1570), who sets forth what is probably the 
most detailed examination of the term ti-yong in the entire East Asian tradition.
 In the West, there are several journal articles that give specific treatment to 
the topic of ti- yong, with these being exclusively works on Neo-Confucianism, 
focusing on the interpretations of Zhu Xi.6
 This is not surprising, since it is in the 
works of Zhu Xi that the paradigm received its most extensive application. In the 
Buddhist studies of North America, both Whalen Lai and Sung Bae Park paid 
much attention to ti-yong in their respective dissertations on the Awakening of 
Mahāyāna Faith. Park also relied on the essence-function paradigm in the 
development of his arguments contained in Buddhist Faith and Sudden 
Enlightenment, and finally wrote a (the only) full English-language book on the 
topic in his One Koreanʼs Approach to Buddhism: The Mom/Momjit Paradigm. 
While this book offers a rich discussion of the meaning and applications of the 
essence-function paradigm, especially its potential as a means of facilitating the 
reconciliation of oneʼs inner spiritual feelings with the “reality” of the external 
world, Park does not provide a detailed inquiry into the historical and philological 
roots of the paradigm. So, it is a topic on which more can certainly be said, 
starting from its earliest appearances in China, and its full-blown development in 
Tang commentaries on the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, Huayan, Tiantai, and 
Chan works, and its formal role in framing some of the most important 
philosophico-religious debates in Korea.
 The investigations that I have made on this topic up to now make one thing 
eminently clear: it is not possible to fully understand the development of the ti-
yong paradigm only in the context of Zhu Xi, or even only Confucianism or Neo-
Confucianism. Nor can it be adequately understood by looking at it only from its 
Buddhist or Daoist manifestations. As this paradigm passed through periods of 
history being adopted, adapted, and used by each of these traditions, it gained 
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important new dimensions to its meaning. For instance, although Neo-Confucians 
such as the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, and Toegye apply ti-yong (mainly via i-gi 理
氣) to refer to the originally pure mind and its variegated manifestations, this was 
not the way it was first applied by Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249). It takes on the pure 
mind/varied manifestations application only with the appearance of the Awakening 
of Mahāyāna Faith, *Vajrasamādhi-sūtra, the East Asian Buddha-nature 
commentarial tradition, and the development of Huayan li-shi metaphysics. As 
with other seminal Neo-Confucian concepts, it is not possible to envision the 
emergence of i-gi or the Neo-Confucian understanding of ti-yong without the 
intervening development that took place in Sinitic Buddhism. But following in 
turn, the application of the paradigm as seen in the teaching methods of a modern 
Zen master like Seongcheol would seem to be reliant on the behavioral 
applications of the concept seen in such Neo-Confucian thinkers as Zhu Xi and 
Toegye.
 The first philosophical exegetic application of the term is traditionally 
attributed to the Confucian scholar Wangbi (王弼; 226–249) in his commentary 
to the Daode jing, entitled Laozi zhu 老子注.7  Although its first overt application 
is seen in Wangbiʼs commentary, its usage as a pervasive hermeneutic principle in 
Confucian studies does not come about until the Song dynasty, first in the works 
of the two Cheng brothers and then almost everywhere in the writings of Zhu Xi, 
who refines it, explains it, and applies it many different ways, including the usage 
as a tool for analysis of personal behavior, which seems to be transmitted back to 
Buddhism to influence some forms of Zen instruction, at least in Korea. The most 
pervasive use of the paradigm is seen in Korea, where the most famous debates, 
including the Buddhist debate over sudden and gradual enlightenment,8
 
the debate 
between Buddhists and Confucians during the Goryeo period,9
 
the harmonization 
of the three teachings,10 and last, the greatest, the “four-seven” debate between 




all carried out firmly within the matrix of ti-yong.
 While it is used generally for distinguishing priority in terms of importance, 
according to the context, its applications tend toward the ontological, the 
metaphysical, the ethical, or the personal— but always hermeneutical in one way 
or another. There are also minor differing tendencies to be seen in its various 
applications in Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. A full treatment of the 
paradigm entails not only an accounting of the term ti-yong 體用 itself, but its 
broad range of analogs in the three traditions, such as ben-mo 本末 , ben-ji 本迹 , 
xing-xiang 性相, li-shi 理事, pu-qi 樸器, hou-bo 厚薄, and many more. In 
Buddhism, the usage of this paradigm as a tool for hermeneutic analysis is seen 
considerably greater in Tathāgatagarbha/Buddha-nature-based works and their 
derived schools such as Tiantai, Huayan, and Chan, which makes sense, as their 
doctrines were developed along the same lines. But we also find the essence-
function framework applied in commentaries on, and translations of Madhyamaka 
and Yogâcāra works.
2. Defining Essence-function 體用
 The basic meaning is of the term is given by Shimada Kenji as “Tai and yū 
have a complementary relationship wherein tai is what is fundamental, most 
essential, while yū is derivative, subordinate, secondary.”12 Sung Bae Park takes it 
a bit further in its Buddhist connotations, providing its most important and broad 
meaning in Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment:
 The purpose of the ti-yong formula is to show the inseparability of two seemingly 
separate but in reality nondistinct things. One of the earliest classical works of Chan 
literature, the Platform Sutra, illustrated the relation between ti and yong with the 
analogy of a lamp and its light…Thus, the purpose of the ti-yong hermeneutic 
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device in Chinese Buddhist texts is to remove false discriminations originating from 
a dualistic way of thinking, as reflected in such dichotomies as subject-object, 
means-end, cause-effect, arising-cessation, and birth-death. (36)
 Further connotations are elaborated more fully by Whalen Lai, who writes:
 (1) Ti-yong is an ontological pair. Ti, substance, subsists as a permanent basis to 
changing phenomena. […] (2) Ti-yong is not a causative pair. Ti, substance, does 
not cause yong, function, to come into existence. Ti evolves into yong. Water 
becomes waves. […] (3) Ti- yong is a harmonious pair. In the Awakening of Faith, 
suchness (water) and phenomenal particulars (waves) fuse with one another and 
interpenetrate harmoniously. (4) Ti-yong, being non-causative, is a timeless pair.[…] 
(5) Ti-yong is a sinitic pseudo-“non-dualistic” pair. Ti-yong is a paradoxical pair that 
can imitate the negative nondualistic dialectics of advaya (not-two). (6) Ti-yong has 
other associations that draw on the Han yin-yang tradition. Ti is usually passive; 
yong is active. Ti is ben 本 (basis, origin) whereas yong is mo 末 (end, tip). The 
more mature use of ti-yong, however, collapses the “sequential” overtones involved 
in the above sets which argue that originally the ti was quiet and not moving but in 
the end activity evolved. (The Awakening of Faith, 125–126)
 But I would take issue with item (1), as I do not know of a case where “ti, 
substance, subsists as a permanent basis to changing phenomena…”
Antonio Cua, writing mainly based on his reading of Zhu Xi, shows the vitally 
important ethical dimensions of the paradigm: 
 The distinction of ti and yong may also be rendered as a distinction between inner 
or inward and outer or outward—in the familiar Confucian language, the distinction 
between nei 内 and wai 外 . In this sense, ren 仁 represents the ti, that is, the inward 
character of ethical commitment. The yong, its outer or outward expression, 
depends on the committed personʼs endeavor to pursue actualization of the idea. 
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Because the moral significance of ren depends on li 禮 as representing moral 
tradition, and yi (rightness) 義, the ti, or the nature of the ethical life, depends on its 
yong, that is, oneʼs efforts in pursuing ren.
 By extension, we can also infer that spiritual training carried out from the 
perspective of the ti-yong paradigm can be carried out with two kinds of 
emphasis: ti-oriented and yong-oriented. A sincere and wise religious focus on 
essence will bring about a change in function, and the effects of correction of 
external behavior will gradually permeate the inner person (a phenomenon seen 
superbly explained in the Yogâcāra notion of habit energies (vasana) and seed 
(bīja). In the context of Buddhist practice, an emphasis on meditation could be 
seen as che-oriented, and an emphasis on moral discipline could be seen as yong-
oriented. Engagement in meditation is likely to improve oneʼs practice of the 
precepts, and vice-versa. Some radical Chinese Chan masters are characterized as 
being totally focused on essence and unconcerned about external function, as seen, 
for example, in Huairangʼs laughing at Mazuʼs efforts at gaining enlightenment 
by practicing. (「磨塼豈得成鏡」 景德傳燈錄 T2076.51.240c22). The published 
sermons of the Korean Seon master Seongcheol also indicate a strong che-
oriented tendency, although reports from direct disciples also depict a master 
whose teaching array was replete with expedient devices. Confucius, on the other 
hand, never tells his students to directly cultivate their ren 仁 (che), but endeavors 
to show how to develop it by focusing on the functional behaviors of justice 義 , 
propriety 禮 , filial piety 孝 , and so forth.
3. Essence-function 體用: Problems with English Translation
 Up to now, I have referred to ti-yong in English as “essence and function” 
without mentioning the problematic aspects of this translation (or other 
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translations) into English. Using the English word “function” for yong 用 is not 
problematic. But especially in the wake of postmodern discourse, the usage of the 
word “essence” for ti 體 is problematic. This problematic character derives 
generally from the fact that Western religious and philosophical discourse has 
been more dualistic, as seen in such dichotomies as spirit/matter, subject-object, 
Platonic “ideas,” the general Greek notion of hypokeimenon, or in Aristotleʼs 
discussion of the notion of “essence,” later taken up by prominent Western 
philosophers such as Hegel, understanding it to refer to an indelible, and usually 
hypostatic, entity, self-existent, self-defined, and clearly distinct from its visible 
representation. Many earlier scholars rendered ti in English as “substance,” which 
also presents problems. I have a slight personal preference for “essence” over 
“substance,” since the etymology of substance as “standing below” seems to 
denote more directly an ontological duality that is almost never implied by ti-
yong. It is in part, to escape from this translation problem, that Sung Bae Park has 
abandoned the use of terminology of both “essence-function” and the Korean che-
yong, choosing instead the Korean vernacular terminology mom 몸 and momjit 몸
짓, which mean “body” and “gesture.” But he also felt that the term ti-yong had 
become too much of a philosophical abstraction, and used the Korean vernacular 
in order to personalize it.13
 
In any case, ti is never understood to be a self-existent, 
self- defining quality; it is not an ātman or brahman; it does not refer to svabhāva; 
in fact, there is no truly equivalent term in Indian Buddhism for ti-yong. Ti only 
exists in its mutually-defining reference to yong; some writers say it exists in an 
interpenetrated form with yong. For this reason, if you encounter an article by a 
scholar who refers to ti-yong as a “dichotomy,” you can figure that it is probably 
not worth reading, unless you want to use it as a foil.
 Up to now, I have continued to employ the translation of “essence,” but 
always with the caveat that I do not mean essence in its technical western 
philosophical senses, but rather in commonsense usage. We can then work with 
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the commonsense definition of “the most important, crucial element.”14
 
A good 
metaphor is also provided by the concept of “an extract that has the fundamental 
properties of a substance in concentrated form,”15
 in the sense that ti has strong 
connotations of density, or thickness (often seen expressed in Daoism with the 
Chinese terms hou 厚, nong 濃, etc.).
4. Essence-function 體用 : Appearance in Early Chinese 
Buddhism
 Although he did not use the term ti-yong explicitly, Sengzhao saw a structure 
involving mutual containment of stillness and movement that presages the 




 It is said in the Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra: “Dharmas do not 
come or go, and do not move.” Is their motionless activity to be sought by 
discarding motion and instead pursuing stillness? No, it is within all movements 
that stillness is to be sought. Since stillness is to be sought within all movements, 
though moving, dharmas are always still. Since stillness is to be sought without 
discarding motion, though still, their motion never ceases. Indeed, motion and 
stillness are in no way distinct. (肇論 T 1858.45.151a10–13)
 The mutual containment, yet conceptually prior/after relationship of stillness 
and movement is a basic component of ti-yong. During the Northern and Southern 
Court period, other similar structures play a similar role, including the pairs of 
“trace” 迹 and “that which has a trace” 所以迹.16
  
In Buddhist discourse that 
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attempted to distinguish Buddhism from Confucianism and Daoism—while at the 
same time asserting underlying agreement, the notion of principle and teaching 理
/ 教 was popular (Hirai, tai-yū. 64–66)
 One of the first actual appearances of the term as a pair is found in the 
Hongming ji 弘明集, which emphasizes the critical point that ti and yong are 
neither the same nor different, only possible in relation to each other 
 ( 臣績曰。旣有其體便有其用。語用非體。論體非用。用有興廢。體無生滅 )
將恐見 其用異。便謂心隨境滅 ( 臣績曰惑者迷其體用故不斷猜。何者。夫體
之與用不離不 卽。離體無用故云、不離。用義非體故云、不卽。見其不離而
迷其不卽。迷其不卽 便謂心隨境滅也 )。 (T 2102.52.54c2–4)
 I, Ji, say, “Wherever there is essence, there is function. But the word function refers 
to that which is not essence. The word essence refers to that which is not function. 
In function there is flourish and decline, but in essence there is no arising or 
extinction. I am afraid that if one sees function as being different, he will think that 
the mind is extinguished, following its objects.”
 I, Ji, say, “Deluded people are confused regarding essence and function. Therefore, 
they cannot remove afflictive emotions. Why? Essence and function are neither 
different nor the same. Since, apart from essence there is no function, they are not 
different. Since the meaning of function is different from the meaning of essence, 
they are not the same.
 Seeing their nondifference, one is confused about their non-sameness. Confused 




 One of the earliest prolific users of ti-yong as a hermeneutic tool is Jizang 吉
藏, who employs it extensively throughout his commentaries. In his Exposition of 
the Two Truths (Erdiyi 二諦義) he uses it to articulate an essence-function 
relationship between the paramârtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya. During his time, 
the analogous terms of ben-mo 本末 and li-jiao 理教 were still used with greater 




 If it is the case that the adherents of the three vehicles equally understand the two 
truths, how is it that the Nirvana Sutra makes it clear that the five hundred śrāvakas 
did not understand the two truths. If they were unable to understand the 
conventional truth, how could they possibly understand the ultimate truth? Up to 
now this meaning has not been made clear, but now we are able to apprehend its 
meaning. How? The adherents of the two vehicles [see the world] in terms of 
arising and ceasing, nihilism and eternalism, and do not practice the middle way, do 
not see the Buddha Nature. The middle way is the root. If you donʼt cognize the 
root, how can you know the branches? If you canʼt see the principle, how can you 
know the teaching? (二諦義 T 1854.45.80b1–5)
Teaching 教 in this case refers to the specific way that the truth 理 is taught 
according to the perspective of each school.
 Below, in the context of the discussion of the two truths, Jizang clarifies the 







 Next I will explain the two truths as made different from the two views. In this case 
both of the truths are missed. How so? For sentient beings who are attached to 
existence we teach the ultimate truth. For sentient beings who are attached to 
emptiness we teach the conventional truth. Thus both of these sentient beings are 
attached to existence or nonexistence, and thus they both miss the point. Next I will 
explain how the two realizations are not two; in this both truths are both 
apprehended. How so? Based on duality, one awakens to nondualilty. Duality is the 
teaching of the principle; nonduality is principle of the teaching; duality is the 
nominal of the middle[way]; nonduality is the middle[way] of the nominal; duality 
is the function of the essence; nonduality is the essence of the function. (二諦義 T 
1854 .45.82c1–6)




 Now I will clarify: When there is neither real nor conventional, this is the essence of 
the two truths. When there are real and conventional, this is their function, which is 
also called principle and teaching, and is also called middle[way] and provisional. 
Middle way and provisional are again designated as middle way and provisional. 
Principle and teaching again serve as principle and teaching; and essence and 
function again serve as essence and function. Nonduality is [in the purview of] 
essence; duality is [in the purview of] function. (二諦義 T 1854.45.108b16–19)
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6. Essence-function 體用: The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith
 It would be a rather unwieldy undertaking to provide all the examples the 
application of the essence-function paradigm in the Awakening of Mahāyāna 
Faith,17 since, as most scholars of the text would readily agree, the entire 
expository structure of the text is framed along the lines of ti-yong.
 This starts with the very opening passage, where the author declares that he 
will discuss the AMF in terms of the greatness of the essence 體, aspects 相, and 
function 用 of the Mahāyāna. In fact, even the rendering of the title as 
“Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith” rather than “Awakening of Faith in the 
Mahāyāna” is a recognition of this structure. Basically, the entire structure of the 
Yogâcāra account of consciousness and liberation is rearranged along essence-
function lines.
 At the core of these arguments is the famous metaphor of water and waves. 
The water is quiescent mind as thusness; the waves are the mind in its afflicted, 
unenlightened state, which are brought about, disturbed, by the wind of ignorance. 
Thus the One Mind is said to have a suchness aspect and an arising and ceasing 
aspect. The mind may be disturbed, but it is the same mind, which is merely in a 
different state of function. When the mind is stilled it returns to its original state. 
But in terms of process of adapting the essence function paradigm, the 
relationship between the Laṅkâvatāra- sūtra and the AMF is interesting, with the 
water waves paradigm as an instructive case. Whalen Lai describes the AMF as a 
sinified derivation of the Laṅkâvatāra-sutra, a text that took the first step in trying 
to tread the slippery ground between the Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha models of 
the mind.
 The Laṅkâvatāra-sutra also uses the water waves metaphor, but with an 
interesting difference. Lai writes: “The Laṅkâvatāra-sutra uses the ‘water and 
wave metaphor’ to explain the organic relationship between the ālayavijñāna and 
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the other consciousnesses. ”
 The sea of the storehouse consciousness is permanently subsisting. The wind of the 
phenomenal realm stirs it. Various consciousness spring up [at the sea of the 
storehouse consciousness,] churning out like waves [responding, moment to 
moment, each to its own sense-field] The way in which the sea gives rise to the 
waves, is the way in which the seven vijñānas arise inseparably with the mind [citta, 
ālayavijñāna] Just as the sea agitates and various waves swell out so too the seven 
vijñānas come about not different from the mind. (Lai, 222)
Lai explains further:
 The metaphor of “water and wave” is used by the Laṅkâvatāra-sutra to explain a 
psychological process in which the five senses, the mental center, the ego-conscious 
mind (manas) arise together with the eighth consciousness in an organic fashion, 
being stimulated into endless karmic entanglements by the alluring phenomenal 
realms of the sense-fields. The metaphor is not used to depict a theory of the 
ontological generation of saṃsāra (the phenomenal realm or reality) from out of the 
Suchness Mind itself. The discrepancy did not go unnoticed, as [Hui-yuan discusses 
it in his commentary on the AMF]. …there are crucial differences and the AMFʼs 
formulation is unique. In the Laṅkâvatāra-sutra, the phenomenal realm is said to 
lure the various consciousnesses to action, but in the AMF, the Suchness Mind 
(influenced by ignorance) creates the phenomenal realm out of itself.
 This just one example of the ways that that the Awakening of Mahāyāna 
Faith shifted Buddhist discourse along essence-function lines, and the fact of this 
structure was noticed with great interest by the great Korean scholiast Wonhyo 元
曉 (617–686), who placed primary emphasis on the essence-function structure in 
his commentaries on the AMF, and often relied on this structure in his 
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commentaries on other sutras. The structure also made a deep impression on 
Fazang and the ensuing Huayan masters, who used both the AMF and the essence-
function paradigm, mostly reworked into the terms principle-phenomena to 
organize their own soteriological system, which also greatly influenced Chan 
Buddhism.
7. Essence-function 體用 : Some More Examples
 So I would like to move now to offer a few basic examples of its usage by 
some eminent classical East Asian Buddhist scholiasts.
 One of the most prolific early users of the ti-yong paradigm is Zhiyi 智顗, 
with more than 2,000 instances of usage in his works contained in the Taishō 
corpus. Here, in his commentary on the Diamond Sutra, he describes the 
applications of essence and function, giving the example of hardness as essence as 









無別有無用之體主於用也。亦無別有無體之用 主於體也。不一亦不異 [ 有因 ]
緣故亦可說一說異。
 Now we will generally take hardness and sharpness as a metaphor. It was formerly 
said that the essence [of wisdom] is hardness and its function is sharpness. Its 
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essence being hard, it cannot be corrupted by myriad afflictions. Its function being 
sharp, it can destroy anything. Now the question arises: is the essence only hard and 
not sharp? Is the function only sharp and not hard? Also, it should be the case that 
its essence is not sharp, and its function is not hard. This would mean that without 
being hard and without being sharp, how can we say that they are hard and sharp. 
The Bai lun says: “The eyes do not cognize, and the mind does not see. If there is 
already a separate non vision included, how can one see?” (See T 1569.30.172c15 
ff.) Now, relying on the Madhyamaka-śāstra, we can resolve this by not getting 
trapped in the meaning. What we are now calling hardness and sharpness is neither 
hard nor sharp. They are nominally designated as hard and sharp. It is like defining 
suffering by means of nonsuffering, or defining impermanence by permanence, 
emptiness by nonemptiness. By this one example of language there naturally is no 
fear of this objection. Prajñā is like a great ball of fire untouched on four sides. 
How can one definitely apply essence and function? Essence and function are 
neither the same as, nor different from causes and conditions. Its essence is hard and 
the function is also hard. Its essence is sharp and its function is also sharp. They are 
already not the same but are nominally designated and discussed. If you say that its 
essence is hardness, this implies that its function is sharpness. This is an explanation 
based on the one extreme of nominal designation. Apart from function there is no 
essence, and apart from essence there is no function. Function is tranquil and 
tranquility is function. There is no separate essence that has or lacks function based 
on the function. There is also no separate function that has or lacks essence based on 
essence. Not one, not different, it has cause and condition, and hence it can be said 
as being the same, and being different. (金剛般若經疏T 1698.33.75b4–18)
Thus, essence and function should not be understood in a reified manner, as if 
they are real qualities.
They are provisional, interdependent, designations, and nothing more. This is a 
point that will later be made by the Joseon dynasty Confucian scholar Toegye, in 
his essay on essence-function.
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 It is well known that the Silla monk Wonhyo 元 曉 was one of the most 
prolific users of the essence-function paradigm, getting a major influence from his 
work on the Awakening of Faith 起信 論, which explicates the meaning of 
Mahāyāna in terms of essence 體, aspects 相, and function 用. He applies the ti-
yong structure in many places in his works, both explicitly and implicitly. The 
Huayan scholar Fazang 法藏 (643–712) was also a prolific user of the ti-yong 
paradigm, not surprisingly, since it is in the Huayan corpus that it is probably most 
pervasively applied. Here, essence characterizes the quiescent Dharma realm and 
function characterizes the application of skillful means in saving sentient beings. 
But it is not only these Tathāgatagarbha-oriented scholars who use it for 
explication of structures related to depth and shallowness. The leading exponents 
of the Faxiang 法相 school also employed it extensively. In the Cheng weishi lun 
it is used in a number of places to explain the relationship between various aspects 
of consciousness. For example:
 或執諸識用別體同。或執離心無別心所。爲遮此等種種異執。令於唯識深妙
理中 得如實解故作斯論。若唯有識。云何世間及
 Some hold the position that the consciousnesses differ in function but are the 
same in essence. Some hold the position that apart from mind there are no 
separate mental functions. In order to dispel these various attachments, and to 
have people gain an accurate understanding within this profound principle of 
consciousness-only, I write this treatise. (成唯識論 T 1585.31.1a16–18) 
 Kuiji 窺基 (632–682) also employs it in the explication of consciousness, 18
 
as does Woncheuk 圓 測 (613–696), who describes the ālayavijñāna as essence 
and the remaining forthcoming consciousnesses as function.19
 Even from these few examples, we can begin to pay attention to the fact that 
although the basic application ti-yong of distinguishing priority, importance, etc., 
− 177 −
is uniform, it is applied in a wide range of situations, and if we go through all 




 It is well known that the Silla monk Wonhyo was one of the most prolific 
users of the essence- function paradigm, getting a major influence from his work 
on the Awakening of Faith 起信論 , which explicates the meaning of Mahāyāna in 
terms of essence 體 , aspects 相 , and function 用 . Given that śāstraʼs explicit 
introduction of these terms, it is not surprising that Wonhyo applies the same 
model throughout his exegesis. For example, when explaining the meaning of the 
words in of the title of the treatise, he says:
 In conclusion: “Mahāyāna” is the essence of the doctrine of this treatise; “awakening 
faith” is its efficacious operation. Thus, the title is composed to show the unity of 
essence and function. Hence the words, “Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith.” 
總而言之 大 乘是論之宗體 起信是論之勝能 體用合擧 以標題目 故言大乘起信
論也 (T1844.44.203b7)
Thus, the relationship between jongche 宗體 or “essence of the doctrine” which 
corresponds to the 大 乘 daeseung of the title, and seungneung 勝能 or 
“efficacious operation,” which corresponds to the gisin 起 信 of the title, is here 
considered by Wonhyo simply to be that of che 體 and yong 用.
Therefore, we can say that for Wonhyo, “mahāyāna” and “awakening faith” are 
not to be treated as two separate things, but as two aspects of the same thing.
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 Again just below, in the same commentary, he frames the discussion in terms 
of essence and function.
 The part of the sentence referring to the Buddha Treasure has three significations: 
Praising the excellence of Buddhaʼs mind; praising the excellence of Buddhaʼs form; 
concluding the praises of the person. In praising the excellence of Buddhaʼs mind, 
(one) is praising function and essence. 寶之內亦有三意 先歎心德 次歎色德 第三
句者擧人結歎 歎心 德中 敷用及體 (T1844.44.203b20–21)
 Already before his work on the AMF, but especially after, Wonhyoʼs usage of 
the essence- function framework becomes pervasive, but with it not being 
necessary to explicitly use the terms che and yong. The One Mind in Two aspects, 
and his essence-function understanding of the relationship between the two truths 
become the main ways in which this non-dichotomizing, yet value- distinguishing 
discourse unfolds.20
9. Seon, Jinul, and the Pervasive Frame of Essence-Function
 The way that the essence-function framework ends up framing all of 
subsequent Korean Seon soteriological discourse is in a manner that seamlessly 
evolves out of the models established in Chinese Buddhism, starting from Jizang, 
through the AMF, Huayan Buddhism, and texts such as the *Vajrasamādhi-sūtra, 
which articulate with great force the doctrine of innate purity of the mind, and the 
kinds of practices that are understood as leading to the realization of this original 
mind. Most critical is Jizangʼs articulation of the two truths as being in a nondual, 
essence-function relationship. This basic understanding compounds with and 
supports the water-waves image provided in the AMF, along with its correlative 
One Mind that has the aspect of thusness, and the aspect of arising and ceasing. 
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Such an approach is replicated in the Huayan hermeneutics of principle and 
phenomena as a metaphysical description of cognized reality, and the influential 
soteriological model of faith and practice articulated in the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra 
and the Two Entrances and Four Practices (Er ru sixing lun) 二入四行論 
(attributed to Bodhidharma).
 That is to say, the metaphysically-oriented description of the One Mind as 
being still and enlightened, or turbid and ignorant, merged together with the two 
truths, the first ineffable and the other effable, finds further expression in 
Huayanʼs principle, also inconceivable, ineffable, distinguished from the 
conventional, expressible reality of the conceptual realm. These two are quickly 
restated as being actually one in the statement “non-obstruction between principle 
and phenomena” 理事無礙. But in the framework of the two accesses of 理行二
入 taught in the *Vajrasamādhi, “principle” 理 indicates not only the 
nonconceptual in itself, but “access via the nonconceptual.” This means entering 
enlightenment by simply being enlightened, which is the meaning of the “correct 
faith” 正信 taught in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, and enlightenment by 
sustained application of effort. This structure of principle and practice is exactly 
parallel to that of the principle soteriological pair in Chan practice, sudden 
awakening 頓悟 and the gradual practice 漸 修. In the context of this literature, it 
must be noted that the use of the actual terminology of che-yong is replaced most 
of the time. Che will henceforth be supplanted by i 理 —in Huayan, many Chan 
works, the *Vajrasamādhi, and then later on in Neo-Confucianism. Yong is 
replaced by a variety of terms, according to the situation, for example, shi 事 in 
Huayan, xing 行 in the *Vajrasamādhi, and qi 氣 in Song Confucianism.
 But although all of these related structures are coming into full development 
in Chinese Buddhism, with these obvious correlations, it is in Korean Seon, and 
most importantly in the writings of Jinul 知訥 (1158–1210) (and works attributed 
to him), where principle and phenomena, faith and practice, sudden and gradual 
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are all tied together and framed into an essence-function based system of
practice. And Jinul occasionally reminds us of the old underlying paradigmatic 
structure of che-yong, as in the passage below, where he is discussing the 
relationship of sudden enlightenment and gradual practice based on the essence-
function model, placing priority on the sudden approach, offering a description 
that, in its association of che-yong with stillness and movement, hails back to the 




 At this point, the aspects of alertness and calmness may be explained either in direct 
reference to the ineffable essence of mind (che) or in relation to their earnest 
application in practice (yong). Consequently, [relative] cultivation and [absolute] 
nature are both fully consummated, and principle and practice are mutually 
pervasive. On the roads and byways of practice, there are none that are more 
important than these [viz., alertness and calmness]. The only thing you need is 
proficient cultivation of the mind, which brings liberation from the malady of birth 
and death. Why allow disputations over words and meanings and thus strengthen 
the obstruction of views? If you now skillfully recover the ineffable essence of 
mind, you will be in mutual concordance with the wisdom of the buddhas; so why 
talk about a gradual progression through the three stages of worthiness and the ten 
stages of sanctity? (Translation by Buswell, 149–150)
Jinul invokes the essence-function framework repeatedly throughout his work, as 






 Jinul: If we were to consider these [two] dharmas and their attributes, of the 
thousands of approaches for accessing the principle, there are none that do not 
involve samādhi and prajñā. Taking into account only their essentials, from the 
standpoint of the self-nature they then are characterized as the two aspects of 
essence and function—this is what I have previously called the void and the calm, 
numinous awareness. Samādhi is the essence; prajñā is the function. Because 
[prajñā] is the functioning of the essence, prajñā is not separate from samādhi. 
Because [samādhi] is the essence of the function, samādhi is not separate from 
prajñā. Because where there is samādhi there is prajñā, [samādhi] is calm yet 
constantly aware. Because where there is prajñā there is samādhi, [prajñā] is aware 
yet constantly calm. (Buswell 230)
 It is also within the matrix of Korean Seon Buddhism that the approach of 
Correct Faith as a direct entry to enlightenment, under the label of Patriarchal 
Faith, becomes established in contradistinction to the gradual approach of 
Doctrinal Faith. In the text introduced below, long attributed to Jinul, the “correct 
Mahāyāna faith” of the AMF is taken to be a kind of absolute faith, similar to the 
Christian notion of “leap of faith,”—it is given the label of “patriarchal faith,” 
which is to be distinguished from “doctrinal faith”—the laukika type of faith 
articulated in the Cheng weishi lun and so forth, which is based on rational 
structures of doctrine, which posits the possibility of spiritual improvement based 
on wholesome activity and meditation, eventually leading to Buddhahood.
 The text is the Direct Explanation of the True Mind (Jinsim jikseol; 眞心直
說 ),21
  
where these two kinds of faith are clearly distinguished:




 Someone said: “ How does the faith of the patriarchal teaching and the faith of the 
doctrinal teaching differ?”
 Response: “They differ significantly. The doctrinal teaching allows humans and 





 Those who want to enjoy the fruits of merit believe in the ten kinds of wholesome 
actions as the marvelous cause, and that rebirth as a human or celestial is the happy 
result. Those who enjoy empty quiescence believe in arising and ceasing and causes 
and conditions to be the correct cause, and take suffering, arising, cessation, and the 
path to be the noble result. Those who enjoy Buddhahood believe that the practice 
of the six perfections through the three incalculably long eons are the great cause, 
and that bodhi and nirvāṇa are their direct result.
 The correct faith of the patriarchal teaching is not like these. One does not believe 
in all kinds of conditioned causes and effects. It only demands the faith that one is 
originally Buddha. This nature is originally replete in every single person. The 
marvelous essence 體 of nirvāṇa is fully perfected in every case. One does not need 
to look at the provisional other to find what is originally endowed in oneself. (T 
2019a.48.999b13–999c7)22
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 Thus we have here an essence-function model of faith and practice, with 
Patriarch Faith being the approach of essence (the sudden approach, non-linguistic 
approach, nonconceptual approach, approach of principle), and Doctrinal Faith 
being the approach by function (the gradual approach, accessible by language, 
conventional approach).
 The examples in Jinulʼs work of the application of this paradigm can be cited 
at much further length, and can be further supplemented by examples in the 
writing of those who followed Jinul in the Korean Seon tradition, such influential 
monks as Gihwa and Hyujeong.
10. Neo-Confucian Expansion of the Essence-Function 
Paradigm
 If we can characterize the broad history of the usage and study of essence-
function in East Asian thought by saying that the paradigm was first born out of 
the early Chinese classics, then significantly deepened in the process of its 
incorporation into, and transformation of, Buddhism, we can also say that it 
finally becomes the comprehensive matrix for Neo-Confucian philosophy, with 
Neo-Confucian concepts swimming around in the sea of ti-yong like fish in water. 
There is nothing that goes on in Neo-Confucian thought that is not either 
circumscribed by, or about, or spoke in reference to essence and function, or one 
of its narrower analogues. When all is said on the topic of ti- yong it is clear that 
the overall degree of influence of the paradigm as a hermeneutic tool, the extent, 
and variety of its applications, is most fully promoted in the works of Zhu Xi, 
with the usual caveat that he was probably pushed in this direction based on 
influence received from the Cheng brothers. As was the case with Chan and 
Huayan Buddhists before them, the Neo-Confucians sometimes used the actual 
terminology of ti-yong, but their philosophical system was articulated mainly 
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through the analogous, but more focused structure of principle/material force (li-qi 
理氣).23
 Neo-Confucians took li 理 (K. i) to refer to the deep guiding patterning 
contained in the term dao, but with a greater concern toward moral discourse and 
the problems seen in self-cultivation amidst the competing dynamics of self-
centered and appropriately life-enhancing relationships. Neo- Confucians 
differentiated the guiding patterning dimension of existence from the concrete, 
historical process of dynamic change and constant fracturing into differentiated 
multiplicity. The latter they identified as qi 氣 (K. gi), once the term for vitality 
and the force of feelings, now generalized as the stuff of existence. Qi in its 
concrete and dynamic historicity could itself include qualitative differences, 
described in terms of relative clarity or turbidity.
 As was the case with early Buddhist doctrinal questions and debates, whose 
problems showed an even greater tendency to be framed in ti-yong hermeneutics, 
the concentration of Korean Neo- Confucian writings focused on what is perhaps 
the ultimate Confucian ti-yong conundrum in the history of the tradition, that of 
the relation between the four feelings and seven emotions derived from the 
Doctrine of the Mean, re-evaluated through the essence-function analogs of dao-
mind and human mind, as well as li-qi. This is of course, a reference to the Four-
Seven debate engaged in by Toegye and his various disputants and supporters in 
the mid-Joseon.
 But what is more important that its focused usage in intra-Confucian 
discussion and debate, it is the fact that essence-function was larger and deeper 
than any of the single traditions of Confucianism, Daoism, or Buddhism. It served 
as the basic intellectual matrix for all three of these traditions (and in Japan and 
China, as well as Korea), serving as the medium through which Confucians and 
Buddhists could evaluate each otherʼs systems: to have discussion, or debate, or to
criticize. As I have shown in my recent book The Great Korean Buddhist-
− 185 −
Confucian Debate, when Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳 (1342–1398) and Gihwa 己和 
(Hamheo Deuktong, 1376–1433), the respective leaders of Confucianism and 
Buddhism of their generation, engaged in debate regarding which was the “true” 
religion, they did so wholly through the ti-yong paradigm. Briefly put, ti-yong is 
about consistency between ti and yong, and both Jeong and Gihwa accused the 
rival system of falling short of consistency in within this paradigm.
11. Conclusion
 What I have provided here is nothing but a brief sampling of some of the 
usages of the essence-function paradigm, focusing primarily on some important 
examples of its usage in East Asian Buddhism. But there is far more work that can 
be done here. First of all, we could build a clear picture of the precise character of 
the development of ti-yong analogs in the Confucian classics, primarily the 
Analects and Mencius. We could then compare this with the model that developed 
in the Daode jing and Zhuangzi, where the structure is still implicit, but can be 
clearly demonstrated in a number of different ways. As we have shown to some 
extent in this paper, its early applications in East Asian Buddhism, is such authors 
as Jizang, are mainly toward the purpose of resolving dualistic reception of 
important Buddhist notions such as emptiness and form, wisdom and expedient 
means, where via essence and function they are reunified in the Chinese mind. 
With the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith and Buddha-nature texts, essence takes 
on its connotations originally seen in the ren of Confucius and Mencius, being 
identified with the pure, innate human mind, which functions both skillfully and 
unskillfully. It is this model that is adopted by Song Neo-Confucianism, in its 
pairs of “mind of dao” and “human mind,” the pure faculties of the basic mind 




Buswell, Robert E. Jr, ed. Chinul 知訥 : Selected Works Seoul: Jogye Order of Korean 
Buddhism,  2012. Collected Works of Korean Buddhism.
Cheng, Chung–Ying. “On The Metaphysical Significance Of Ti (Body–Embodiment) In 
Chinese Philosophy: Benti (Origin–Substance) And Ti–Yong (Substance And 
Function).” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29  (2) (2002): 145–161.
Chung, Edward Y. J. The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi Tʼoegye and Yi Yulgok: A 
Reappraisal of the “Four-Seven Thesis” and Its Practical Implications for Self-
Cultivation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
Cua, Antonio S. “On The Ethical Significance Of The Ti–Yong Distinction.” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 29  (2) (2002): 163–170.
Funayama, Tōru. “Tai-yū shōkō 體用小考 .” Usami, Bunri 宇佐美文理 , ed. In Rokuchō 
Zuitō seishinshi no kenkyū 六朝隨唐精神史 . 125–136. JSPS Grant-in-aid report, 
2004.
Gedalecia, David. “Excursion in Substance and Function: The Development of the Tʼ
i-Yung Paradigm in Chu Hsi.” Philosophy East and West 24  (4) (1974): 443–451.
Hirai, Shunʼei 平井俊栄.  “Chugoku bukkyō to taiyū shisō 中国仏教と体用思想.” Risō 
理想  549  (1979): 60–72.
Kalton, Michael. The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation. Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1994.
Kong, Roberta Lion. “Metaphysics and East-West Philosophy: Applying the Chinese Tʼ
i-yung Paradigm.” Philosophy East and West 29  (1) 49–58.
Lai, Whalen. The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (Ta-ch’eng ch’i-hsin lun): A Study of 
the Unfolding of Sinitic Mahayana Motifs. Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 
1975.
Lai, Whalen W. “Chʼan Metaphors: Waves, Water, Mirror, Lamp.” Philosophy East and 
West 29  (1983): 243–253.
Lynn, Richard John. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te 
Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. The classic of the way and virtue. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Muller, A. Charles. “The Key Operative Concepts in Korean Buddhist Syncretic 
Philosophy: Interpenetration and Essence-Function in Wŏnhyo, Chinul and Kihwa.” 
− 187 −
Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen University 3  (1995): 33–48.
----. “The Composition of Self-Transformation Thought in Classical East Asian 
Philosophy and Religion.” Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen University 4  (1996): 141–152.
----. “Tiyong and Interpenetration in the Analects of Confucius: The Sacred as Secular.” 
Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen University 8  (2000): 93–106.
----. Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Chŏng Tojŏn (Sambong) 
and Hamhŏ Tŭkt’ong (Kihwa). Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press,  2015.
Park, Sung Bae. One Koreanʼs Approach to Buddhism: The Mom/Momjit Paradigm. 
Albany: SUNY Press,  2009.
----. Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment. Albany: SUNY Press, 1983.
Shimada, Kenji. Shushigaku to Yōmeigaku 朱子学と陽明学 . Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 
1967.
----. “Taiyū no rekishi ni yosete 體用の歴史に寄せて .” Tsukamoto Hakase hanju kinen 
bukkyōshi ronshū 塚本博士頒壽記念佛教史學論集 . 416–432. Tokyo: 1991.
1 Described in The Mom/Momjit Paradigm, pp. 6–7.
2 This is a point that virtually all scholars who have written on the topic take as self-
evident .  Hirai,  Shimada, Lai, Park ,  and  Funayama all state this point 
straightforwardly.
3 The four levels of religious awareness are: (1) awareness of phenomena 事; (2) 
awareness of principle 理; (3) awareness of the nonobstruction between principle 
and phenomena 理事無礙; (4) awareness of non-obstruction among phenomena 事
事無礙.
4 Cheng Hao 程顥, 1032–1085; and Cheng Yi 程頤, 1033–1107).
5 Explained in Michael Kaltonʼs The Four-Seven Debate and Edward Chungʼs The 
Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye.
6 See, for example, the articles by Cheng, Cua, Gedalecia, and Kong.
7 See especially his commentary to Chapter 38. English translation by Richard Lynn 
(1999). The evidence that Wangbi was the first to actually make usage of this 
construction is not fully conclusive, as has been argued by Funayama (2004).
8 See Sung Bae Park, Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment.
− 188 −
9 Examined in my book, The Great Korean Buddhist-Confucian Debate.
10 Best exemplified in Hyujeongʼs (1520–1604) 休靜 Samga gwigam 三家龜鑑 .
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 ［菅野氏のコメント］　体用パラダイムには、第一に A ＝用、B ＝体とする
場合がある。そのうえで、体と用とをやや区別することに重点を置く場合
と、あるいは体と用との端的な相即を強調する場合とがあったようである。
第二に、A ＝用、B ＝用としたうえで、非 A 非 B ＝体として、A の B の対
立を解消する場合がある。これは、スン・ベイ・パク氏が体用の定義で述
べている「体用という対概念の目的は、一見別々に見えるが実は別ならざ
る二つのものの不可分性を示すことにある」という指摘と共通するもので
あり、またミュラー氏が引用している吉蔵の『二諦義』に見られる、真諦
＝用、俗諦＝用、非真非俗＝体という構造と共通である。吉蔵はとくにこ
の論理を好んでいると、私は考えている。この第一と第二との区別は、ミュ
ラー氏の体用パラダイムの分析には重要ではないのであろうか。ご意見を
お聞かせ願いたい。
　体用パラダイムについて注意しなければならない最も難しい点は、その
適用のされかたがとても柔軟であるという点だと、私は思います。ある状
況では「体」であると見られる概念あるいは物（もの）が、別の状況では
「用」だと見られることがあります。また、吉蔵の例からもわかるように、
ふつうは「体」と「用」とに区別される二つのものが、両方合わせて「用」
だと解釈され、「体」は何かほかのものだとされる場合があります。そこ
で「体」とされるものは、かなり多くの場合、何かより抽象的なもの、あ
− 197 −
るいはことばで表現できない何ものかとされています。
　私の論文は今のままでもかなり長文ですし、この学術会議のテーマは仏
教ですから、朱子学の伝統からさらに多くの情報を盛り込むことはひかえ
ました。しかし「本質とはたらき」の適用がきわめて柔軟性に富んでいる
ことを示す最も興味深い事例の一つは、李氏朝鮮の儒学者のテゲ（退渓、
イ・フワン・李滉 ; 1501–1570）の『シム・ム・チェヨン・ピョン』（『心
無體用辨 』＝心は本質とはたらきを持たないという立場に対する批評。
出典：テゲ・ジョンセオ／退溪全書、 41:16b-19a）という有名な論書の中
に見られます。テゲはまず、中国の古典に現れる最も早い事例から、まだ
「体用」という術語が発明されていないのに、本質とはたらきはすでにさ
まざまな異なったとらえかたをされている、と指摘します。『易経』では、
無活動の静まりと活発な刺激であると見られていますし、『礼記』では静
寂と運動で、『中庸』では、顕在的なるものと非顕在的なるもの、そして
『孟子』では、根源的な人間の本姓とその感情だとされるのです。
　テゲは本質には少なくとも二つの側面があると指摘します。一つはさま
ざまな原理に関する議論の中で適用されるもので、例えば（程子の場合）
「それは表われることなく、特徴を欠き、それにもかかわらずあらゆる現
象がその中で花開いている（冲漠無朕而萬象森然已具）」などとされます。
　もう一方は、具体的な事物の議論の中で適用されるもので、たとえば
「船は水上を行くことができ、車は陸上を行くことができ、この船と車を
乗せる水と陸地がこれ（つまり本質）である」のように適用されます。こ
のため朱子は呂氏からの手紙への返事の中でこう言っています─「形而
上学的に言えば、表われていないものこそ間違いなく本質（体）であり、
具体的な事物の領域でとらえられるものが、はたらき（用）とされるの
だ。だから形而上なるものが本質（体）であって、世界を貫く五つのもの
（天下之達五道）ははたらき（用）だと、簡単に一般化して言うことはで
きないのだ」。（有就事物而言者，如舟可行水，車可行陸，而舟車之行水、
行陸是也。故朱子 答呂子約書曰、' 自形而上者言之，冲漠者固爲體，而其
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發於事物之間者，爲之用 ; 若以形而下者言之，則事物又爲體，而其理之發
見者，爲之用。不可槪謂形而上者爲道之體，而天下之達道五爲道之用。）
彼の反対者たちはこう言います─「本質（体）は抽象から起きてくるの
であり、はたらき（用）は動きから起きてくる」（體起於象，用起於動）
と。しかしテゲはこう反論します─「これは物理的な領域の具体的な事
物に関してしか該当しない。だから結局は、ことの一側面しか示さないの
であり、形而上なるもの、つまり印のないもの、すなわち本質とはたらき
（体用）の一なる源の妙なるところを、見失ってしまう。そういう人は物
理的な形態の表面的な表われにとらわれてしまっているのである」（只說
得形而下事物之體用。落在下一邊了，實遺却形而上冲漠無朕、體用一源之
妙矣。惟其滯見於形象之末）。
　基本的に、テゲの主な主張はこういうことです─われわれは「体用」
を単純な存在論的な文脈で見てしまいがちだが、実は、具体的な事物どう
しの関係にも適用されれば、非顕在的なものと顕在的なものの間でも使わ
れるし、抽象的なものと具体的なものの間でも用いられるのであって、さ
まざまなかたちで理解されるべきである、と。
 ［菅野氏のコメント］　最後に、小さな問題であるが、「7. 体用─さらなる
用例」において、智顗の体用パラダイムを紹介するために、『金剛般若経疏』
を引用しているが、これは、平井俊榮氏の研究（『法華文句の成立に関する
研究』11-40 頁、春秋社、1985 年）によれば、智顗の著作ではなく、後世
のものである。
　その点は知りませんでした。では、真の著者を特定できるようにしたい
と思います。いずれにせよ、だれが著者だとしても、これは中国の初期の
仏教文献の中で最も興味深い適用例の一つだと思います。
 ［菅野氏のコメント］　また、『成唯識論』を引用しているが、インドの論書
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を中国の体用パラダイムを示す例として引用するのには問題があると思わ
れる。
　これについては、どういう点で問題なのか、私にはよくわかりません。
ここでのポイントは、（中国的な華厳、天台などよりもむしろ）法相のよ
うなインド起源の思潮における論書類でさえも、インドでは決して（体用
パラダイムを）使わないだろうと思われるような場合にも、論者たちが中
国人であるため、体用パラダイムを躊躇なく使っていることを示すことで
す。
（翻訳担当　伊藤真）
